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AIDS PREVENTION AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: BURMA AS THE HARD
CASE
Rhianna M. Fronapfel†
Abstract: Many commentators suggest that states have a human rights obligation
to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS within their borders. Specifically, state HIV/AIDS
prevention obligations are often premised on the “right to health” contained within many
international human rights documents. Other approaches encourage states to implement
AIDS prevention measures by emphasizing the detrimental effects of AIDS on
economies and national and international security instead. Many commentators who
adhere to the health-and-human-rights model, however, reject such other approaches as
overly concerned with the interests of developed countries and lacking the ethical focus
that underlies health and human rights. Implicit in such arguments is the suggestion that
the health-and-human-rights approach is, or should be, the exclusive or preeminent way
to encourage states to comply with suggested AIDS prevention measures.
The health-and-human-rights approach, however, is not universally relevant to the
development of AIDS prevention measures. This is particularly evidenced by Burma, a
country that has failed to take any significant steps to abate its quickly accelerating
HIV/AIDS crisis despite the government’s official statements and actions manifesting an
intent to combat the epidemic. Burma’s failure is especially disquieting in light of the
proven success of measures suggested by international health and AIDS organizations,
and models offered by countries such as Thailand with similar epidemics and winning
prevention strategies. International human rights law lacks the binding or enforcement
power to compel the state’s compliance with international HIV/AIDS agreements, and
the abysmal health and human rights record of the Burmese government suggests that
Burma is unlikely to be swayed by the ethical call of a health-and-human-rights
approach. Thus, Burma serves as an example of where the health-and-human-rights
approach fails to bring about compliance with HIV/AIDS prevention measures,
highlights the weaknesses of the approach, and compels the conclusion that the right to
health is not a model that is universally applicable or useful in encouraging state
compliance with AIDS prevention measures.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The HIV/AIDS pandemic is a problem of international concern.1 As
the severity of the disease increased to epidemic proportions over the last
two decades, developed states and the international community began to
explore ways to aid and encourage developing states to treat and prevent the
spread of the disease within their borders. A host of approaches arose that
aimed at encouraging developing states to implement HIV/AIDS prevention
†
The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor for her advice and guidance in the
development of this Comment.
1
Lawrence O. Gostin, The Global Reach of HIV/AIDS: Science, Politics, Economics and Research,
17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (“HIV/AIDS affects people throughout the world—their health, their
communities, and their countries’ economic structures. It is truly a global epidemic, imposing a burden on
all countries and regions, leaving none immune to its devastating impact.”).
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measures and to dedicate the resources necessary to do so. Many such
approaches encourage states to prevent the spread of AIDS in order to
dampen the disease’s detrimental impact on economic stability and
international and national security.2
Accompanying the rising prominence of human rights in international
law, many commentators have promoted an alternate approach that
conceptualizes the duty of states to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS within
the health-and-human-rights paradigm. Such an approach focuses on the
duty of states to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in order to comply with the
“right to health” provisions found within many international human rights
documents.3 The right-to-health approach is not necessarily incompatible
with those approaches that focus on factors such as economics and security.
Nonetheless, a tension exists between them.4 The very existence of nonhuman-rights-based approaches implies that the right-to-health model is not
always adequate, standing alone, to encourage resistant states to implement
HIV/AIDS prevention measures. The suggestion that human rights is not
always the most viable way to conceptualize state health and HIV/AIDS
obligations, however, has proven controversial among some health-andhuman-rights adherents, a number of whom reject the other approaches
altogether. For example, a leading opponent of non-human-rights-based
approaches argues that issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention are best
conceptualized within a health-and-human-rights paradigm focused on
health justice and equity rather than the “self-serving relativism” of a
security-based approach.5

2
See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Caught Between Paradise and Power: Public Health, Pathogenic
Threats, and the Axis of Illness, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 45 (2004).
3
See infra Part II.B. See generally International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCR]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4,
1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; and United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
4
Compare PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR
ON THE POOR 195 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005) (2003) (promoting a human rights approach to improving
health and criticizing security-based approaches), with DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (questioning the feasibility of a human rights approach to
infectious disease treatment and prevention, and discussing alternative approaches such as ones based on
trade and security).
5
FARMER, supra note 4.
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Burma6 serves as an interesting lens through which to view this debate
because of the severity of the country’s AIDS epidemic and the particular
failure of the Burmese leadership to take any significant steps to implement
prevention measures.7 The country is facing a major health crisis as the
AIDS epidemic steadily increases largely unabated within its borders. The
last official report by the World Health Organization (“WHO”) puts the HIV
prevalence rate in Burma at 0.77% as of the end of 2001, fourth behind those
countries with the highest rates of infection in Asia: Cambodia, Thailand,
and India.8 According to a 2004 estimate of the Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS (“UNAIDS”), the rate of HIV/AIDS among
adults is approximately 1.2% and as high as 2.2%.9 Other estimates put the
current rate of infection in Burma as high as 4%, just behind Cambodia’s.10
Given the prevention successes in the other high-prevalence countries,
Burma is poised to become the country with the highest HIV infection rates
in Asia if current trends continue.11 UNAIDS has recognized the seriousness
of Burma’s AIDS situation and identified Burma as one of the three highestpriority countries in Southeast Asia, stating that “there is a genuine potential
for this very serious epidemic to grow out of control unless an effective
coordinated response is urgently implemented.”12 Burma’s government has
exhibited a commitment to combat the epidemic by finally acknowledging
its existence after a long period of denial,13 and engaging in a five-year
6
This Comment refers to the country in question as “Burma.” It should be noted that the Burmese
government changed the country’s name to the ostensibly more ethnically inclusive name “Myanmar” in
1989. Many ethnic groups, however, reject the name “Myanmar” itself as ethnically exclusive, and while
the United Nations and the business community usually employ the “Myanmar” designation, many
Western governments (including the United States), non-governmental organizations, and commentators
continue to refer to the country as “Burma.” The use of “Burma” in this Comment is for the sake of
consistency and expediency, and is not meant to signal an allegiance to either side of this debate. See Myint
Zan, Judicial Independence in Burma: Constitutional History, Actual Practice and Future Prospects, 4 S.
CROSS U. L. REV. 17 n.1 (2000).
7
See infra Part III.B.
8
World Health Organization (“WHO”), HIV/AIDS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC REGION 2003, at 11
(2003).
9
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (“UNAIDS”)/WHO, Myanmar: Epidemiological
Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections, 2004 Update at 2 (2004), available at
http://www.who.int/GlobalAtlas/predefinedReports/EFS2004/EFS_PDFs/EFS2004_MM.pdf .
10
Chris Breyer et al., Assessing the Magnitude of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Burma, 32 J. ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 311, 311 (2003); Jeremy Sarkin & Marek Pietschmann, Legitimate
Humanitarian Intervention under International Law in the Context of the Current Human Rights and
Humanitarian Crisis in Burma (Myanmar), 33 HONG KONG L.J. 371, 384 (2003).
11
See ELISABETH PISANI, MONITORING THE AIDS PANDEMIC NETWORK, AIDS IN ASIA: FACE THE
FACTS 23 (2004), available at http://www.fhi.org/en/HIVAIDS/pub/survreports/aids_in_asia.htm (follow
“Chapter 1” hyperlink).
12
UNAIDS, JOINT PROGRAMME FOR HIV/AIDS: MYANMAR 2003–2005 1 (Apr. 1, 2004), available
at http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/una-docs/jpmyanmar_15jul04_en_pdf.pdf.
13
Myanmar: Sickening, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 9, 2000.
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UNAIDS plan, which includes guidelines for the government to increase
prevention efforts.14 Despite these representations, the Burmese government
has failed to respond to the AIDS epidemic in any significant way,15 largely
preferring official denial of the severity of the crisis to serious abatement
efforts.16
This Comment argues that the health-and-human-rights approach is
not universally useful in encouraging states to prevent the spread of AIDS,
as evidenced by Burma’s situation. The right-to-health approach is an
inadequate mechanism to encourage Burma’s compliance because the
Burmese government is unlikely to be swayed by the ethical call of the
health-and-human-rights approach, and international human rights law lacks
the enforcement mechanisms or binding power necessary to compel Burma’s
compliance with international HIV/AIDS prevention agreements.
Examining the health-and-human-rights approach through the Burmese lens
demonstrates that the approach is not sufficient to persuade all states to
prevent the spread of AIDS.
Part II of this Comment examines the various approaches to
HIV/AIDS prevention and the tensions between them. Part III observes that
the overall rate of HIV/AIDS infection is steadily increasing in Burma as a
result of the government’s failure to institute prevention measures. Part IV
argues that the right to health is an inadequate mechanism with which to
enforce Burma’s compliance with AIDS prevention measures. Finally, Part
V argues that Burma is unlikely to voluntarily implement AIDS prevention
measures in order to fulfill the ethical call of a health-and-human-rights
approach.
II.

BACKGROUND: HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER APPROACHES
TO HIV/AIDS PREVENTION

Within the human rights discourse, many commentators suggest that
states have an obligation to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS in order to
comply with the right to health found in many international human rights
treaties.17
Other more pragmatic approaches exist that encourage
compliance with prevention measures by focusing on the detrimental
14

Id.
Id.
16
Tony Broadmoor, Edging Towards Disaster, 11 THE IRRAWADDY, May 2003,
http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/2003/vol11.4/cover.html.
17
See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, The International Human Right to Health, 22 S.U. L. REV. 1, 181-182
(1994) (noting that states should address the AIDS epidemic in order to comply with their right to health
obligations).
15
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security and economic effects of AIDS.18 Many proponents of health and
human rights characterize such other approaches as being overly
preoccupied with the interests of developed countries, while lacking an
appropriate emphasis on ethics.19 Implicit in that argument is the suggestion
that health and human rights are, or should be, the exclusive or pre-eminent
mechanism with which to encourage state compliance with AIDS prevention
measures.20
A.

Many Commentators Suggest That States Have a Human Rights
Obligation to Prevent the Spread of HIV/AIDS Within Their Borders

Ever since Jonathan Mann, the first director of the World Health
Organization’s Global Program on AIDS, identified HIV/AIDS as a human
rights issue,21 many commentators have framed the obligation of states to
deal with the AIDS epidemic with reference to international human rights
law.22 HIV/AIDS and the international human right to health have
developed symbiotically over the past two decades.23 Not only has
HIV/AIDS served as a catalyst for bringing the right to health to the
forefront of human rights law,24 but framing HIV/AIDS as a right-to-health
issue allowed it to be “anchored in international law,” whereby governments
are publicly accountable, at least theoretically, for their actions toward
people affected by the disease.25 HIV/AIDS is the first worldwide epidemic
to arise in the modern era of human rights,26 and has, in a sense, become a
test case for human rights in the context of public health.27
In keeping with this trend, UNAIDS frames HIV/AIDS prevention
and treatment largely as a health-and-human-rights issue. According to
18
David P. Fidler, Public Health and National Security in the Global Age: Infectious Diseases,
Bioterrorism, and Realpolitik, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 787 (2003) (advocating a security-based
approach).
19
See, e.g., FARMER, supra note 4.
20
Id. at 199.
21
Jonathan Mann, Human Rights and AIDS: The Future of the Pandemic, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
195, 203-206 (1996).
22
See, e.g., David Patterson & Leslie London, International Law, Human Rights and HIV/AIDS,
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2002 80(12), at 965 (2002); UNAIDS Global Reference Group
on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, Issue Paper: Monitoring a Rights-Based Approach, Fourth Meeting,
August 23-25, 2004; and, UNAIDS Global Reference Group on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, Public
Report, Second Meeting, August 25-27, 2003.
23
Sofia Gruskin & Daniel Tarantola, Health and Human Rights 1 (Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center
for Health Hum. Rts., Working Paper No. 10, 2000).
24
Id.
25
Id.; LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, THE AIDS PANDEMIC: COMPLACENCY, INJUSTICE, AND UNFULFILLED
EXPECTATIONS 62 (2004).
26
FIDLER, supra note 4, at 198.
27
Id.
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UNAIDS, in order for states to combat the AIDS epidemic, “the right to
health care, information and other social and economic rights inscribed in
United Nations Human Rights conventions and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights must be realized.”28
In addition, a number of international guidelines address the
obligation of states to deal with HIV/AIDS under international human rights
law. While not legally binding,29 such documents clarify the right to health
as it operates within the context of HIV/AIDS and the human rights of those
living with the disease.30 For example, in 1996, the United Nations prepared
a set of guidelines called the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and
Human Rights.31 These guidelines not only called on states to ensure that
their AIDS policies were consistent with “international human rights
obligations,”32 and the principle of non-discrimination,33 but also to ensure
the “widespread availability of qualitative prevention measures and services,
adequate HIV prevention and care information and safe and effective
medication at an affordable price.”34 Thus, many human rights adherents
conceptualize the obligation of states to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS
within their borders as a human rights issue, and many international
documents reflect this perceived link between AIDS prevention and human
rights.
B.

State HIV/AIDS Prevention Obligations Are Often Premised on the
Right to Health

Within the health-and-human-rights paradigm, the duty of states to
deal with HIV/AIDS within their borders, including preventing its spread, is
often conceptualized as a state’s duty to comply with the right to health
28

U.N. General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, June 25-27, 2001, Together We Can:
Leadership in a World of AIDS 16, UNAIDS/01.34E (June 2001), available at http://www.unaids.
org/en/resources/publications/corporate+publications.asp.
29
Such instruments are referred to as “soft law,” and include international documents, declarations,
reports, or other instruments which “may be loosely defined as declared norms of conduct understood as
legally nonbinding by those accepting the norms.” JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW :
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 32 (2002). While nonbinding, such
documents “are meant to, and in fact do, influence government behavior.” Id. at 24.
30
See, e.g., Patterson & London, supra note 22, at 965 (discussing what is required from states by
the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights).
31
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Second International Consultation
on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, Annex 1, delivered to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/37 (Jan. 20, 1997), available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1997/documentation/
commission/e-cn4-1997-37.htm.
32
Id. at Guideline 3.
33
Id. at Guideline 5.
34
Id. at Guideline 6.
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found in many international human rights instruments.35 For example,
prominent commentators Lesley Stone and Lawrence Gostin argue that
government policies focused on respecting and protecting the right to health,
such as the promotion of scientifically proven prevention measures like
condom use and needle exchange programs, “will best curb the spread of
HIV/AIDS.”36 Thus, understanding how HIV/AIDS prevention fits within
the health-and-human-rights schema requires an understanding of the
meaning of the right to health.
The international right to health was first enshrined in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),37 which is regarded as
the first major international human rights document and the “cornerstone of
the modern human rights movement.”38 In addition to recognizing the right
to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,39 the right to equal
protection of the law,40 and the right to freedom of religion,41 Article 25 of
the UDHR expressly recognizes the right to health as an element of the right
to an adequate standard of living:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.42
Despite the widespread recognition of the UDHR pronouncements, this
declaration itself is not a legally binding document.43
35
See Mary Ann Torres, Public Health and International Law: The Human Right to Health,
National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment: a Case Study from Venezuela, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 105
(2002) (examining Venezuela’s obligations to treat those with HIV/AIDS within their obligations to honor
their right to health); see also Roger Phillips, South Africa’s Right to Health Care: International and
Constitutional Duties in Relation to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 9 (2004) (examining
South Africa’s duties in regard to treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS within its obligations to honor the
right to health); Jamar, supra, note 17 (discussing the right to health in general and noting that states should
address the AIDS epidemic in order to comply with their right to health obligations).
36
Lesley Stone & Lawrence O. Gostin, Using Human Rights to Combat the HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 31
HUM. RTS. 2, 3 (2004).
37
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
38
Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313.
39
UDHR, supra note 37, art. 5.
40
Id. at art. 7.
41
Id. at art. 18.
42
Id. at art. 25 (1).
43
Patterson & London, supra note 22, at 964; see also explanation of “soft law,” supra note 29.
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Since the inception of the UDHR, many of its provisions have been
incorporated into numerous state constitutions and more than twenty binding
multilateral treaties.44 The two most important of these treaties are the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”)45 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”).46 Together with the UDHR, these two major treaties are often
referred to as the “International Bill of Human Rights.”47 While the ICCPR
does not refer to health, the ICESCR specifically recognizes the right to
health. Article 12 provides that “the States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health”48 and “[t]he steps to be taken by the
States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this
right shall include those necessary for . . . [t]he prevention, treatment, and
control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases.”49 As of
April 2005, 142 countries have ratified the ICESCR.50 Burma, however, has
not yet signed or ratified the treaty, and is therefore not bound by its
provisions.51
Other multilateral human rights treaties with right-to-health provisions
focus on specific populations.52 Two that similarly include a right to health
within their provisions are the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)53 and the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).54 Article 12 of CEDAW
provides that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure,
on the basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services,
including those related to family planning.”55 Article 24 of CRC addresses
the right to health more directly, providing that states “recognize the right of
the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to
44

Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313.
ICESCR, supra note 3.
46
U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 302
[hereinafter ICCPR].
47
Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313.
48
ICESCR, supra note 3, art. 12(1).
49
Id. at art. 12(2).
50
Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313.
51
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of the Ratifications of
the Principal International Human Rights Treaties As of 09 June 2004, at 7, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf..
52
Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313; ICERD, supra note 3, art. 5(e)(iv).
53
CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 12.
54
CRC, supra note 3, art. 24.
55
CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 12(1).
45
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facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.”56 Burma is
a party to both CEDAW and the CRC, the only two major human rights
treaties to which it is a party.57 While there are a number of regional human
rights treaties that also contain right-to-health provisions,58 there is no such
treaty for Asia, and therefore Burma is not bound by a regional human rights
treaty.59
In addition to these binding treaties, human rights conference
participants have passed a number of non-binding resolutions elaborating on
the right to health.60 For example, the 1978 Alma Alta Declaration called
upon nations to provide for the availability of essential health care, including
education concerning the prevention and control of health problems and
diseases.61
C.

Non-Human-Rights Approaches Similarly Serve to Encourage States
to Implement AIDS Prevention Measures

While the health-and-human-rights approach to AIDS prevention has
gained prominence, many commentators instead emphasize approaches that
have roots pre-dating the origin of the health-and-human-rights model, and
that focus on pragmatic concerns such as the detrimental effect of the AIDS
epidemic on economic and security factors.62
56

CRC, supra note 3, art. 24(1).
Officer of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 51.
58
See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), art. 16, (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986); Organization of
American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), art. 10, opened for signature Nov. 17,
1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999); and, European Convention on the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as
amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December
1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively).
59
Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 313.
60
Id. at 314; see, e.g., 1993 World Conference on Human Rights (U.N. 1993c, 1998a); 1995 World
Summit for Social Development (U.N. 1995b).
61
Gruskin & Tarantola, supra note 23, at 320.
62
See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 18 (examining the linkage between public health issues, including
HIV/AIDS, and national security); David P. Fidler, Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights,
and U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 99 (2004) (examining HIV/AIDS as a U.S. national
security issue); J.M. Spectar, The Olde Order Crumbleth: HIV-Pestilence As a Security Issue & New
Thinking About Core Concepts in International Affairs, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. REV. 481 (2003)
(examining the link between HIV/AIDS and national, regional, and global security); International Crisis
Group, HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, ICG Report (Washington, D.C./Brussels June 19, 2001), available at
http://www.icg.org//library/documents/report_archive/A400321_19062001.pdf; Alex de Waal, Why the
HIV/AIDS Pandemic is a Structural Threat to Africa’s Governance and Economic Development, 27 FALL
FLETCHER F. ON WORLD AFF. 6 (2003); Susan K. Sell, Trade Issues and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 933 (2003).
57
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The HIV/AIDS epidemic is seen as a threat to national security

Various nations and commentators conceptualize HIV/AIDS as a
national and international security threat because the severity of the
epidemic correlates to national and international unrest.63 According to the
International Crisis Group,64 “AIDS can no longer be understood or
responded to as primarily a public health crisis. It is becoming a threat to
security.”65 Likewise, in January of 2000, the U.N. Security Council
addressed the disease in terms of security implications,66 and for the first
time passed a unanimous resolution relating to HIV/AIDS.67 The resolution
recognized that an unchecked HIV/AIDS pandemic could pose a risk to
stability and security, and encouraged interested member states to assist with
the creation and execution of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention and
treatment.68 Beginning with the administration of U.S. President Clinton,
who “claimed that emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, especially
HIV/AIDS, constituted a national security threat and foreign policy
challenge for the United States,”69 U.S. policy has similarly conceptualized
HIV/AIDS as a security issue.70
While the health-and-human-rights regime focuses on the ethical
duties of states to deal with HIV/AIDS, conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a
security issue encourages states to take action to further their own individual
and collective interests. Conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue
encourages high-prevalence states to deal with the AIDS epidemic within
their borders in order to preserve national security.71 In the hardest-hit
countries in Africa, for example, “the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS on
the military forces, economies, and governance systems . . . represents a
direct national security threat . . . because HIV/AIDS is destroying the
material sources of state power.”72 The fact that HIV/AIDS is harmful to the
power and stability of a regime is a factor likely to encourage a state

63

International Crisis Group, supra note 62, at i.
The International Crisis Group is a “private, multinational organization committed to
strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and
contain conflict.” Id. at Appendix A.
65
Id. at i.
66
Fidler, supra note 18, at 792.
67
S.C. Res. 1308, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1308 (July 17, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/
regions/africa/000717_unsc_hivaids.html.
68
Id.
69
Fidler, supra note 18, at 792.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 843.
72
Id.
64
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concerned with its own survival to take measures proven successful to quell
the spread of the epidemic.
Conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue also encourages
wealthier states to channel resources into high-prevalence states in order to
prevent the global spread of the disease and further international and
collective security.73 A former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. responded to
the Security Council resolution regarding HIV/AIDS: “We have to recognize
that while interdependence gives economic opportunities, it also can pose
global threats. You cannot deny AIDS a visa; you cannot embargo it or
quarantine it; you cannot stop it at a border. That is why we must work
together.”74 Conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue encourages
states to funnel resources into high prevalence countries in order to serve
their own security interests. 75
2.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic is also seen as a threat to national economy

Likewise, various nations and commentators attempt to promote the
implementation of prevention measures by focusing on HIV/AIDS as a
threat to economic vitality and stability.76 Like the security approach, an
economics approach to HIV/AIDS prevention encourages states to take
action not out of an obligation to respect the fundamental right to health, but
to further their own individual and collective interests.77 Simply put,
employing AIDS prevention measures benefits a developing nation because
the economic impact of AIDS is greater than the economic cost of
implementing such measures.78 AIDS has the cumulative effect of
decreasing productivity and increasing costs.79 The impact of the disease
reduced the gross domestic product (“GDP”) of Africa’s hardest-hit
countries by one percent.80 HIV/AIDS also decreases business investment
as the consumer-base diminishes and becomes more impoverished.81
AIDS’ ability to weaken national economies may also have
international implications because “AIDS-fuelled economic disintegration, if
73
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left unchecked, could cut severely into world supplies of key natural
resources.”82 The international economic effects of AIDS therefore motivate
developed nations, at least to some extent, to funnel resources into high
prevalence developing nations in order to protect their own economic
interests.83
D.

Many Commentators Reject Non-Human Rights Approaches to
HIV/AIDS Prevention as Overly Concerned With the Interests of
Developed Countries and Lacking an Ethical Focus

While such pragmatic approaches to HIV/AIDS prevention are not
necessarily incompatible with an approach that focuses on AIDS prevention
as a right-to-health duty, a tension exists between them. Prominent
commentator David Fidler suggests, for example, that “the universalist,
right-to-health ideology that guided international public health in the WHO’s
first five decades is, controversially, giving way to arguments centered again
on the self-interests of the great powers.”84 He further questions why many
public health officials consider human rights law the “crown jewel” of
global public health strategy in the first place.85
On the other hand, many health-and-human-rights commentators
disparage security and economic approaches as lacking the fundamental
rights focus of the health-and-human-rights model, criticizing the “selfserving relativism” of the non-human-rights-based approaches.86 Implicit in
such arguments is the suggestion that the health-and-human-rights approach
is, or should be, the exclusive or preeminent way to encourage states to
comply with suggested AIDS prevention measures. Jonathan Mann, former
director of WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS, and the founding father of
the health-and-human-rights approach to HIV/AIDS prevention and
treatment, stated that “the human rights framework offers public health a
more coherent, comprehensive, and practical framework for analysis and
action on the societal root causes of vulnerability to HIV/AIDS than any
framework inherited from traditional public health or biomedical science”
(emphasis added).87 Such statements suggest that health and human rights
should be the approach taken to HIV/AIDS prevention in place of, rather
than in addition to, approaches that focus on the detrimental effect of AIDS
82
83
84
85
86
87
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on economies and security. As David Fidler states, “[m]any public health
experts see human rights as . . . the best way to promote and protect public
health” (emphasis added).88
III.

THE OVERALL RATE OF HIV/AIDS INFECTION IS STEADILY INCREASING
IN BURMA AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO INSTITUTE
PREVENTION MEASURES

Successful strategies to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS are clearly
established, proven in practice by states such as Thailand with once-serious
epidemics, and readily available for implementation.89 While the similarity
of Burma’s and Thailand’s AIDS epidemics suggest that the measures
employed in Thailand would also be successful in Burma, the Burmese
government has failed to employ such strategies to combat HIV/AIDS
within its borders.90 As a result, the rate of HIV/AIDS within Burma
continues to increase.
A.

The International Community and Thailand Have Established
Successful Prevention Strategies

Strategies that work to dampen the spread of HIV/AIDS, especially
those aimed at the sex industry, are no longer a mystery. According to a
comprehensive 2004 report from the organization Monitoring the AIDS
Pandemic (“MAP”), commercial sex remains the most common risk
behavior and driving force of the epidemic in Asia, while needle-sharing
between injection drug users (“IDUs”) also contributes significantly to the
epidemic in many Asian countries.91 Thus, it should come as little surprise
that the recommended approaches for tackling the epidemic in these
countries include prevention and education campaigns aimed at cutting the
proportion of men who engage in commercial sex, promoting the use of
condoms among those who do,92 and promoting safe and consistent access to
sterile injecting equipment for IDUs.93 These HIV/AIDS prevention and
88

FIDLER, supra note 4, at 170.
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treatment strategies are well-accepted and have proven successful in
practice.94
Burma’s neighbor, Thailand, is widely regarded as a model of
successful HIV/AIDS prevention.95 While Thailand’s prevention strategies
have not yet had a significant impact on HIV/AIDS in the IDU population,96
Thailand is nevertheless one of the few countries that has managed to curb
the spread of a potentially serious AIDS epidemic.97 The country has the
second highest prevalence rate in Asia behind Cambodia, and was the first
country in Asia to document HIV among IDUs, female sex workers
(“FSWs”), and their clients.98 Working with international organizations such
as WHO and UNAIDS, Thailand responded to the epidemic early, focusing
specifically on reducing the number of men visiting FSWs and promoting
condom use in all sexual interactions.99 As a result of these efforts, the
percentage of adult men engaging in commercial sex annually fell from
roughly 25% to 10%,100 condoms are now used in 90% of commercial sex
transactions,101 the rate of HIV among FSWs declined from its peak of 33%
in 1994 to 12% in 2002,102 and the overall rate of AIDS in Thailand is
steadily declining.103 It is likely that Thailand’s rate of infection would have
been in the millions rather than the hundreds of thousands had Thailand not
vigorously promoted condom use.104
B.

Burma Has Failed to Effectively Institute Any of the Proven
Prevention Strategies

The similarity of Burma’s and Thailand’s AIDS epidemics suggest
that Burma could succeed in combating AIDS using some of the same
measures implemented by Thailand. Like Thailand, Burma’s AIDS
94
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epidemic is largely fuelled by the sex industry, with IDUs also playing a
prominent role in the transmission of the disease.105 Furthermore, the rates
and general trends of HIV infections among IDUs and FSWs in Burma are
similar to those in the early years of Thailand’s epidemic, a factor that
suggests that Burma could successfully combat its AIDS epidemic using
Thailand’s approach as a model.106 Likewise, the first two objectives of the
Joint Programme of Action engaged in by Burma and UNAIDS include
preventative measures successful in Thailand and elsewhere.107 The first,
“[i]ndividual risk of sexual transmission of HIV reduced,” recommends
measures to promote the consistent use of condoms by making them more
accessible and affordable, particularly in the context of paid sex.108 The
second, “[i]ndividual risk of HIV transmission among injecting drug users
and their partners reduced,” recommends measures to improve the access
and quality of drug treatment measures aimed at lowering the rate of needlesharing among IDUs.109
Burma has yet to effectively institute any of the measures suggested
by the international community, the UNAIDS plan, or the Thailand model.110
Burma’s rate of HIV/AIDS reflects this failure. While Thailand’s “100%
condoms” program decreased the rate of HIV infection in the FSW
community from 33% in 1994 to 12% in 2003, HIV prevalence among those
FSWs tested in Burma increased from 4% in 1992 to 32% in 2003. 111 The
overall rate of HIV/AIDS is steadily increasing in turn.112
The Burmese government has not only failed to allocate resources to
implement the prevention measures outlined in the UNAIDS plan, but also
maintains policies that actually impair prevention measures. For example,
while Burma has publicly announced that condom use is now part of its
prevention campaigns, women are still routinely arrested for possessing
condoms on the assumption that those who carry them work in the sex
trade.113 Furthermore, Burma’s Press Scrutiny Board (“PSB”) still censors
AIDS coverage and bans the word “condom” from appearing in literature.114
Indeed, state media are largely banned from reporting about AIDS
105
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altogether.115 Similarly, while needles and syringes can be purchased with a
prescription, they are illegal to carry and may result in a fine and up to six
months in prison.116 The HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns that have been
implemented avoid any mention of sex or the need for drug addicts to use
clean needles, instead urging people to “stay faithful to your spouse” and
“respect family values.”117 Recent news articles report that Burmese
authorities threatened a youth member of the rival democratic party with
arrest for advocating the prevention of HIV/AIDS, ordering him to take
down a signboard on his house reading, “Let us prevent AIDS from
spreading,”118 and arrested a seventy-year-old man for possessing and
reading an educational leaflet on the prevention of HIV/AIDS.119 Thus,
Burma’s restrictive policies towards condoms, syringes, and education
regarding their use seriously hampers efforts to quell the spread of the
epidemic.
IV.

BURMA IS NOT BOUND TO IMPLEMENT HIV/AIDS PREVENTION
MEASURES BY AN OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH

Despite the contentions of many health-and-human-rights adherents, a
health-and-human-rights approach to HIV/AIDS prevention is simply not
workable in every situation. While the AIDS situation in Burma is dire,
Burma has failed to implement even the most minimal of prevention
measures.120 The health-and-human-rights approach will not work to
encourage Burma’s compliance with such recommendations because
international human rights law lacks the binding or enforcement power
necessary to compel Burma’s cooperation. The right to health is a vague
concept, and the duties of states such as Burma under the right to health are
unclear. This lack of clarity renders a state’s duties to prevent the spread of
HIV/AIDS under the right imprecise as well. In addition, Burma is not a
115
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party to any treaty with a right-to-health obligation broad enough to
encompass HIV/AIDS prevention measures, and the vagueness of the right
to health precludes its classification as customary international law.121
Finally, even if there was a binding right-to-health obligation on Burma
broad enough to encompass HIV/AIDS prevention, international human
rights law lacks the mechanisms to enforce such an obligation on an
unwilling state such as Burma.
A.

The Ambiguity Inherent in the Right to Health Inhibits the Formation
of a Universal Standard or Clear HIV/AIDS Prevention Duties

The right to health is an inherently ambiguous concept that has largely
“defied efforts to give it more than a broad, aspirational meaning.”122 WHO
first recognized the right to health as a fundamental right in its constitution,
defining health broadly as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social
wellbeing.”123 Similarly, the International Covenant on Economic and
Social Rights (“ICESCR”) defined the right as “the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.”124 The United Nation’s Economic
and Social Council released a General Comment in 2000 in an attempt to
further elucidate the right to health.125 The Comment incorporates both
medical care and preventative measures within the right-to-health mandate:
The committee interprets the right to health, as defined in
article 12.1 [of the ICESCR], as an inclusive right extending
not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the
underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and
potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of
safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and
environmental conditions, and access to health-related
education and information, including on sexual and
reproductive health.126
121
Customary international law evolves from state practice followed from a sense of legal obligation
instead of a process of treaty law involving formal negotiation and express consent. A rule of customary
international law binds all states that did not object to the rule while it was in the process of formation.
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Despite these broad definitions of the right to health, a government does not
have a duty to ensure the perfect health of its populace. As one commentator
states, “[t]he overall human rights framework allows individuals life, liberty,
and the pursuit of obesity.”127
Likewise, a state is not obligated to devote as many resources as are
needed to fully realize the right to health regardless of the state’s available
economic resources.128 Rather, as the Economic and Social Council
Comment on the right to health states, “[t]he notion of ‘the highest attainable
standard of health’ in article 12.1 [of the ICECSR] takes into account both
the individual’s biological and socio-economic preconditions and a State’s
available resources.”129 Thus, poorer countries are not required to spend as
much per capita on health as wealthier countries, and the rate of infectious
diseases in countries such as Burma need not necessarily be comparable to
those in countries such as the United States.130
Instead, a state’s compliance with the right to health depends on the
universally recognized principle of “progressive realization,”131 whereby a
state progressively works “as expeditiously and effectively as possible”132
toward fulfilling right-to-health goals “within the parameters of available
economic resources and epidemiological conditions.”133 While the principle
of progressive realization recognizes the economic disparities that may
effect the ability of states to promote health within their borders, a state is
nonetheless required to “show constant progress in moving towards full
realization of rights.”134 Hence, while the inability of a state to comply with
health obligations may be permissible under progressive realization, a total
unwillingness of a state party to comply with its right-to-health obligations is
not.135
The concept of progressive realization affects the general duties of
states in terms of the right to health. Generally speaking, a government’s
responsibility in regard to the right to health is understood to include
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right.136 A government must
127
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respect the right by not violating it directly (e.g., withholding care from
prisoners), protect the right by preventing its violation by non-state actors
(e.g., making it illegal to deny health insurance to a sub-population), and
fulfill the right by implementing affirmative measures towards its
achievement.137 When these duties are examined through the lens of
progressive realization, however, it becomes difficult to determine at what
point a government crosses the line between permissible inaction due to lack
of resources, and impermissible inaction in violation of the right to health.138
Because the principle of progressive realization guarantees that a right-tohealth treaty provision will mean different things depending on the
economic situation of the state to which it applies, the principle both “creates
problems for elaborating the content of the right to health” itself, and
likewise, makes it more difficult to determine whether a particular state is
violating its health obligations.139 As one commentator stated, “[t]his sort of
generalized approach leaves one with little hard content; if the right to health
covers everything, then it means nothing.”140 In response to this ambiguity,
commentators have attempted to clarify a government’s right-to-health
obligations under progressive realization by analyzing relevant treaties for
both minimum and maximum content,141 as well as positive and negative
duties in regard to the right to health.142
The minimum-content approach attempts to construct a narrower
definition of the right-to-health in addition to the broad, aspirational
definitions above, by giving more concrete content to right-to-health
obligations and defining the duties of all states under progressive
realization.143 For example, WHO’s right-to-health initiative is premised on
the assumption that there exists a universal minimum right to primary health
care, regardless of a particular state’s economic resources.144 A health care
program must include, at a minimum, “education concerning prevailing
health problems and the methods of preventing and controlling them”145 and
“prevention and control of locally endemic diseases.”146
137
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Establishing negative and positive duties of states under this narrower
right-to-health obligation is another way commentators have attempted to
solidify state responsibility.147 As one commentator states:
The narrower, core conception of the right includes negative
and positive aspects. Examples of the negative aspect include
the duty of states to refrain from barring access to health-related
information and the duty of states not to take health-harming
actions. The affirmative aspect of the narrow, core right to
health imposes a duty on a state to intervene or to act, to the
extent of its available resources, to prevent, reduce, or address
serious threats to the health of individuals or the population.
An example may be a failure of a state to address the AIDS
epidemic through at least education and minimal public health
actions.148
Under the negative-positive duty rubric, a state has both a negative duty not
to prevent access to health information or take actions harmful to health, and
a positive duty to take at least some affirmative steps to educate the public
regarding health.149 The focus on a state’s negative duties theoretically
overcomes the vagueness inherent in progressive realization, at least in
regard to those things that a state must refrain from doing. If it costs nothing
for a state simply not to impede the flow of information, then there is no
problem of lack of resources upon which the progressive realization
principle is premised. Thus, such negative duties can theoretically be made
binding on parties to right-to-health treaty provisions regardless of their
economic resources. For example, it could be argued that a state has a
negative duty not to censor information regarding how to prevent the spread
of AIDS. Because it does not cost a state anything to simply refrain from
acting, economic disparities between countries would not render the duty to
refrain from censoring more difficult in a poorer country. Thus, the duty not
to censor could theoretically be made binding on those states that are parties
to treaties with right-to-health provisions regardless of economic disparities
and regardless of the principle of progressive realization.
Despite the apparent clarity of the negative conception of a state’s
right-to-health duties, some ambiguity exists even under this narrower
characterization. For example, some nations prefer to forego or limit
147
148
149
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condom promotion campaigns in favor of campaigns promoting
abstinence.150 Such abstinence-only programs, like those found in the
United States,151 are likely the best-funded HIV prevention programs in the
world.152 Whether such nations are violating the right to health of their
people by inhibiting the flow of information about condom use is unclear,
but the fact that many states choose abstinence promotion over the
endorsement of condom use highlights the absence of a universally accepted
duty of states to protect the right to health, even in the negative sense.
As for the affirmative duties under this narrower conception, the
vagueness inherent in progressive realization still inhibits the formation of a
universal standard. 153 For example, while there is a basic affirmative duty
for a state to take steps to prevent locally endemic diseases, “the allocative
problem exists just as strongly for [this] basic, almost minimal activit[y].”154
The duty of any particular state is still dependent on the extent of its
available resources and a violation of the right to health under the
affirmative prong still depends on a case-by-case analysis.155 Despite the
difficulties with progressive realization and accompanying minimumcontent analysis of the right to health, these methods are most commonly
used to analyze and give substance to a state’s obligation under the right to
health.156
When the obligation of states to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS is
conceptualized under the rubric of international human rights law generally
and the right to health specifically, the scope of the obligation suffers from
the same ambiguities. A broadly defined right to health, such as WHO’s
definition as “a state of complete physical, mental, and social well being,”
can’t realistically be achieved in any context and is simply unenforceable.157
Similarly, the principle of progressive realization renders the right to health
indeterminate, and whether a particular state’s AIDS program violates the
state’s right-to-health obligations is largely dependent on the state’s

150

Joanne Csete, Abstinence and Ignorance: Dismissing Science in the Fight against AIDS, 31 HUM.
RTS. MAG. 7 (2004).
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
See Jamar, supra note 17, at 57.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 61.
156
See Jamar, supra note 17.
157
GOSTIN, supra note 25, at 82.

190

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 1

particular economic situation, and must be determined by an analysis of that
situation rather than simply by reference to a universal standard.158
Defining the right to health more narrowly for the purpose of
identifying enforceable criteria may help to determine when a state violates
its right-to-health obligations with regard to AIDS.159
Similarly,
distinguishing between a state’s duty to take affirmative steps (such as
spreading condom awareness) and the duty to refrain from certain activity
(such as censoring AIDS awareness campaigns by non-state actors) can,
theoretically, establish some universal duties on the part of states, at least to
refrain from certain conduct. As discussed above, however, even under the
narrower conceptions, a state’s duty to take minimal affirmative steps is
rendered unclear by the principle of progressive realization, while the state’s
negative duties are also somewhat ambiguous.
In sum, even if the right to health is binding on states such as Burma,
it is unclear what HIV/AIDS prevention measures a state must implement or
allow in order to comply with its duties in guaranteeing the right to health.
The ambiguity inherent in the right-to-health concept inhibits the articulation
of clear HIV/AIDS prevention duties on the part of states under the right to
health.
B.

Specific Treaty Provisions to Which Burma Is a Party Fail to
Establish a Binding Right to Health Obligation Broad Enough to
Encompass HIV/AIDS Prevention Measures

There is no right-to-health obligation binding on Burma that clearly
establishes an obligation to implement HIV/AIDS prevention measures.
Burma is not a party to the ICESCR, the main international document that
binds states parties to recognize the right to health.160 The only major
international human rights treaties to which Burma is a party are CEDAW161
and CRC.162
While Burma is bound by the provisions of CEDAW, it is unlikely
that the health care provision will be interpreted to impose an affirmative
duty to implement the provisions of the UNAIDS plan. CEDAW calls on
158
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states’ parties “[to] take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those
related to family planning.”163 The language of the CEDAW health care
provision is framed in terms of equality in the provision of health care
services already offered, however, rather than as a duty to provide a
particular type of health care service (aside from family planning) in the first
place.164 Additionally, the emphasis of the treaty’s language is on health care
rather than health itself, which would imply that Burma could satisfy its duty
simply by providing health care services for those who seek them. A duty to
prevent the spread of disease by distributing condoms, raising awareness
about how to prevent the transmission of the AIDS virus, or otherwise, does
not clearly fall within this narrow right to health care.
Similarly, it is unlikely that the CRC’s right-to-health provision will
impose an affirmative duty on Burma to implement the provisions of the
UNAIDS plan. The CRC declares that “States Parties recognize the right of
the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to
facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health.”165 In
addition, the CRC calls on state parties, among other things, to ensure the
provision of necessary health care to children166 and the development of
preventative health care.167 While the provision refers to both the broad
right to health (rather than the more narrow right-to-health-care provision of
CEDAW) and to the need for preventative health care, the CRC applies only
to the rights of children, a population of individuals who are much less likely
to contract the disease through sexual or intravenous drug use activity.168
Thus, the CRC does not encompass a state duty to supply AIDS prevention
measures to the adult population.
C.

The Right to Health Does Not Rise to the Level of Customary
International Law

Even if Burma is not a party to a treaty with a general right-to-health
provision like that contained in ICESCR, such a general right would still be
binding on Burma if it was found to be customary international law.
163
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Customary international law is defined by the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations as that which “results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”169
Thus, in order to qualify as customary international law, a practice must
satisfy both the state practice and opinio juris (state’s sense of legal
obligation) prongs of the customary international law definition.170 Once a
practice qualifies as customary international law, it is binding on all states
that have not objected persistently to the practice, regardless of whether they
have specifically ratified a treaty containing an agreement to comply with
it.171
Commentators differ on whether the right to health, or international
documents containing the right, have ascended to the level of customary
international law. Some observers have stated, for example, that “to the
extent the right to health is enunciated in the UDHR, it is likely customary
international law,”172 and “there is considerable support for the proposition
that the rights embodied in the ICESCR should be considered part of
customary law.”173 Factors that support a finding that the right to health
constitutes customary international law include the fact that the right is
found, in one form or another, in numerous multilateral treaties and nonbinding international documents,174 and the fact that many nations have
established an explicit right to health in their constitutions, otherwise
subscribed in some way to the right itself, or acceded to international
documents that contain the right within their provisions.175 Indeed, Burma
169
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itself has integrated many of the provisions of the UDHR into its domestic
law and its constitution.176 In 1999, Burmese Foreign Minister U Win Aung
categorically stated in an address to the United Nations General Assembly
that “we fully prescribe [sic] to the human rights norms enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”177 While this pronouncement
alone does not make the UDHR binding on Burma, such statements may
serve as indications that its provisions have risen to the level of customary
international law.178
On the other hand, many U.S. scholars have rejected the contention
that economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the right to health, are
customary international law.179 One article noted that “although some parts
of the [UDHR] have been so widely recognized that they have become
customary international law, and therefore binding on all nations that have
not opposed them, there is no indication that the right to health has been
recognized in this manner.”180 Likewise, other commentators stated,
“[w]hile the standard advanced by General Comment 14 [to the ICESCR]
may eventually become customary international law, the universal
acceptance of a broad right to health may nonetheless not occur for an
extended period of time.”181
The major factor weighing against finding a right to health in
customary international law is the ambiguity of the right-to-health concept,
which prevents a consistent state practice, followed out of a sense of legal
obligation, from developing. Because the right to health is generally framed
in broad, aspirational terms, it is very difficult to define the scope of a state’s
obligations.182
Furthermore, the principle of progressive realization
guarantees that the right to health differs depending on the context in which
it applies, making it difficult or impossible to form a customary international
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law standard.183 Even a core minimum-content approach184 to the right to
health requires states only to take steps, outside of the core minimum content
of the right, toward the progressive realization of rights depending on the
states’ particular economic circumstances.185 If the right to health means
different things in different contexts, it will be very difficult to show both a
consistent state practice and an opinio juris of states regarding the right.
It could be argued that the negative duties of states to refrain from
taking measures harmful to health or interfering with health information
have gained the requisite consistent state practice and opinio juris to achieve
the level of customary international law.186 Under this theory, while Burma
may not have an affirmative obligation to implement AIDS awareness
campaigns, distribute condoms, or educate sex workers regarding their use,
it would have a negative duty under customary international law not to
interfere with helpful health measures such as the possession of condoms or
syringes and AIDS awareness campaigns regarding prevention methods.
It is unclear, in light of the continued popularity of abstinence-only
campaigns in countries such as the United States and others,187 whether the
negative duties of states under the right to health obligate them to allow
information regarding the best methods of preventing HIV/AIDS
transmission (such as condom use). Burma may well argue that negative
duties allow for education regarding certain kinds of prevention measures
over others. For instance, while there are reports that Burmese police
officers arrest those who possess condoms, the Burmese government allows
abstinence campaigns urging individuals to forego extra-marital sexual
activity altogether.188 Likewise, while Burma bans the possession of
syringes, it allows the existence of anti-drug campaigns.189 Many states
adhere to an abstinence-based platform in their fight against HIV/AIDS,
thereby choosing a method other than that recommended by the international
community.
This fact weighs heavily against finding that the
implementation of those health programs and measures deemed most
effective by the international community has achieved the consistent state
practice and opinio juris necessary for customary international law status.

183

Cf. Jamar, supra note 17, at 52.
See supra, Part IV.A.
185
See Meier, supra note 182, at 158.
186
See Jamar, supra note 17, at 58-59 (noting that a state may be found in violation of the right to
health if it obstructs access to medical care or health-related information).
187
Csete, supra note 150.
188
See discussion supra, Part III.B.
189
Id.
184

FEBRUARY 2006

D.

AIDS PREVENTION AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH

195

Even If Burma Were Bound to Implement HIV/AIDS Prevention
Measures, International Human Rights Law Lacks Adequate
Mechanisms to Enforce Such an Obligation

Finally, even if a duty under the right to health were binding on
Burma, and the current AIDS policies, or lack thereof, constituted a violation
of that duty, there are no adequate mechanisms under international human
rights law to enforce such an obligation. The lack of enforcement
mechanisms for human rights law is a general problem of international
law.190 State sovereignty is one of the guiding principles of international
law, generally requiring the consent of sovereign entities for them to be
bound by and comply with international law.191 Thus, the international
community is reluctant to interfere with a state’s internal affairs, even when
there is a clear international duty binding on the state and a clear violation of
that duty by the state.192 Additionally, enforcement of international law is
fundamentally hindered by the general principle of non-intervention
enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.193 That section prohibits
member states from “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state,”194 and thus outlaws all uses of force
against states, even those states violating clear and binding international
duties, except when authorized by the U.N. Security Council or when taken
in self defense.195
As discussed previously, the duties of a state in regard to health are
unclear and “getting a handle on the content of the right to health is a
necessary first step to effective implementation.”196 Until core or negative
health duties of states are defined so that they apply universally to all states,
regardless of progressive realization, it is unlikely that the right will have
clear enough parameters to compel the international community to enforce
it, even against states with policies as harmful as Burma’s. Similarly, it is
not clear that Burma is bound to a right to health general enough to
encompass the duty to prevent the spread of AIDS at all. Until Burma either
accedes to the ICESCR, or the right to health gains customary international
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law status, it is unlikely that the international community will enforce a
state’s duty to protect the right in the absence of a clearly binding obligation.
Even if the international community were willing to enforce a duty on
Burma to protect the right to health in the context of furthering the AIDS
prevention cause, mechanisms to do so do not exist. Social human rights are
hindered by weak enforcement mechanisms in general.197 Even under the
ICESCR, there is “no international supervisory body that is entitled to
receive and examine complaints submitted by individuals who claim to be . .
. victim[s] of a violation of the right to the highest attainable level of
health.”198 Thus, the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention,
the lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the lack of clarity inherent in the
right to health all render Burma’s duty to implement HIV/AIDS prevention
measures unenforceable.
V.

BURMA IS UNLIKELY TO BE SWAYED BY
HEALTH-AND-HUMAN-RIGHTS APPROACH

THE

ETHICAL CALL

OF A

Due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms in human rights law,199
compliance with human rights norms in general and the right to health in
particular depend in large part on state consent.200 Implementation of
international human rights law domestically depends on national legislation,
policies, and programs that incorporate and execute human rights norms.201
The implementation of such national legislation, policies, and programs in
turn depends on the political willingness of the implementing state.202 Such
is also the case in regard to the implementation of AIDS prevention
measures.203 In the words of Kofi Anan, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, “[a]bove all, the challenge of AIDS is a test of leadership.”204
Therefore, the domestic implementation of international human rights law
depends in large part on a state’s willingness to recognize and realize its
ethical duty to respect fundamental human rights.
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The Burmese government, however, has proven itself highly resistant
to being swayed by the ethical call of the human rights community. The
Burmese government is largely unresponsive to the needs of its populace.
The current military junta came to power through a military coup in 1962,
after which it promptly assigned the new government leader, General Ne
Win, full legislative, judicial, and executive powers of the state.205 In its
forty years of military rule, Burma’s current regime has “abandoned all
constitutional structures, has continually silenced any opposition and, above
all, has continued to apply ruthless and inhumane means to achieve its
ends—supposedly in the interests of the maintenance of the ‘Union.’”206
As might be expected, the Burmese military junta has an abysmal
human rights record. The long list of abuses perpetrated by the government
includes: extra-judicial killings by security forces; torture of prisoners and
detainees; arbitrary arrests; forced labor, including the widespread use of
forced child labor; forced conscription of civilians into militia units; severe
restrictions on the freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and
movement; and, discrimination against and harassment of Muslims and
women.207
Likewise, education and health care are low priorities for the
government, regardless of the needs or desires of the populace.208 Total
government spending on health has declined by more than seventy percent
since 1990,209 and the government’s total expenditures on health and
education are less than one percent of the national GDP.210 The regime
spends over two hundred percent more on the military than it does on health
and education combined.211 By comparison, the United States government
spends almost fourteen percent of its GDP on healthcare, and Canada just
over nine percent.212
Burma’s lack of accountability to its populace and its continued
unwillingness to comply with international human rights norms indicates
that Burma’s government is simply unresponsive to the ethical call of
international human rights law. In order for international human rights law
and the right to health to have an effect on Burma’s policies, there must be
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mechanisms to compel Burma’s compliance. An appeal to ethics is simply
not enough.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Burma serves as an example of where the health and human rights
approach to HIV/AIDS has failed, thereby compelling the conclusion that
the right to health is not a model that is universally applicable or useful.
This is not to suggest that other, more pragmatic approaches to the problem
will necessarily be successful in the Burmese context. The impact of AIDS
on Burma’s already weak and isolated economy will not necessarily be
enough to spur Burma’s regime to take action. Likewise, while national
security is a matter of concern for the Burmese government, the impact of
AIDS is not likely to be a primary concern in light of much more pressing
security issues.
Acknowledging the weaknesses of the health-and-human-rights
approach to HIV/AIDS prevention in the Burmese and other contexts,
however, can allow for a more holistic and realistic approach to AIDS
prevention in the developing world. The approaches taken must incorporate
both pragmatic and human rights components, depending on the context in
which they are implemented. In difficult contexts such as that in Burma, an
approach that subsumes health and human rights as the best method of
encouraging compliance with AIDS prevention measures is destined to fail.

